by Raúl M (Tigre)

First Fights. The Bug river crossing – 22 June 1941

The stars were still shining in the dark. To the East beyond the Bug the horizont was turning red as the dawn was getting closer. At 03:15 hours the artillery, rocket launchers and mortars roared and the infantry had jumped out.

The enemy was surprised and the Bug was crossed without resistence. The main bridge at Sokal fell intact in german hands. The first recce planes reported about the withdrawal of Soviet columns to the East.

At 05:00 hours the 57 ID broke through the fortified positions and the main height known as “Sokal Berg” had been seized. Also the 75 ID had broken out the enemy line seizing the Height 222, in spite of that several bulwarks were fighting yet. The Corps’ Commander was waiting the signal in order to exploit the success by launching the 11 Pz to the enemy’s rear.

Around 10:00 hours, the infantry’s advance proceeded with good pace. The 57 ID’s spearhead had reached height 234, north of Perespa, while the bulk of that división had broken into the wooded land located south of Horbkow while pressing forward towards Tartakow. The 75 ID had reached Kopytow and was advancing towards Tartakow also.

The enemy withdrew to the east. The war bridges were ready and the bridge located at Krystynopol was seized also intact by the troops belonging to the XXXXIV AK. Finally at 12:00 hours the Army Corps’ Commander allowed the 11 Pz crossing with the task of seizing the fords over the Styr river at Szczurowjee and Berestetzko.

At 15:00 hours the german infantry had reached the objectives assigned for that day, the line Perespa – Tartakow – Kopytow. The 11 Pz, with its Recce Detachement in the lead, past through Sokal. At Kol. Rawszczynia an enemy bulwark was fighting yet so its fires hampered the division’s supply road (Panzerstraße).

By afternoon, the infantry found some resistance again along the line Perespa – Tartakow – Bobiatyn – Rojatyn, where was fighting the AA 175. Around 20:00 hours, the AA 157 entered in Torki.

Around 23:00 hours, the 11 Pz reached the western edge of Stojanow, which was defended by hostiles motorized elements. The first day in the new campaign had been a success, the enemy defense along the Bug had been broken and the Army Corps had pushed as far as 20 kilómeters in the enemy’s rear.

The first tank’s engagement at Radziechow (23 June 1941)

The night from 22 to 23 Jun 1941, passed more or less quietly and by 03:30 hours the infantry resumed its advance due East. The Army Corps’ engineers started the mopping up operations against all the forts that still were in action around Sokal. Early in the morning and after a short fight the 11 Pz had seized Stojanow knocking out the first Soviet tanks.

At 05:30 hours the advance guard pressed on towards Radziechow meeting the enemy north of that town. The oponent there, which was coming from Cholojew as had been reported by the aerial reconnaissance, was motorized and had tanks. The PR (Panzerregiment) 15 under Oberst Riebel (later KIA) pushed against Radziechow jumping out from its readiness area west of the town.

The enemy put strong resistance, nevertheless by noon was compeled to retreat to the south, leaving behind 30 destroyed tanks. Around 17:00 hours the 11 Pz reached Lopatyn with its SR (Schützenregiment) 110 after taking also Chmielno.

The KSB (Kradschützenbatallion) 61 had seized the bridges over the Styr river at Merwa and Berestetzko. Meanwhile the 57 ID had reached the line Stofanow- Wolica- Druzkopo and the 75 ID was pushing against the line Druzkopol-Pieczychwsty with elements on the fords at Choloniow and Saro Stawy. Those fords fell in german hands by nightfall but the troops had suffered some casualties due to Russian counterattacks.

At Horochow and the high ground north of it there was enemy with heavy artillery yet, also there were Russian troops in the deep north flank, south and southwest of Poryk; there was covering the AA 175. The bunker at Kol. Rawszczynia still put resistance hampering the movements of supply trains towards the front.

Around 18:30 hours the SR 110 had reached Szczurowice, establishing a bridgehead there, however the bridge was destroyed. At Radziechow, the 297 ID’s advance guard relieved the Pz AA 11. The XXXXVIII Pz Korps could release its elements engaged on the south flank. Around 21:00 hours the AA 157 had got across the Styr at Plaszowa. The Corps’ CP was at Perespa.

Across the Styr river, to Dubno – 24 June 1941

Around 07:00 hours the aerial reconnaissance reported about a great number of enemy tanks south of the Panzerstraße. The 11 Pz should deploy a panzer company south of Lopatyn as a covering force. The 57 ID was moving towards the Styr river since early morning without enemy actions. The 75 ID pressed against the enemy located north of Tartakow, which withdrew towards the east. From 12:00 hours onwards, that division fell under the LV AK’s framework. Around 08:00 hours the KS Btl 61 had established a bridgehead at Ostrow. Aerial attacks carried out by the enemy over the bridge at Szczurowice and the Panzerstraße, hampered the movements of the 11 Pz.

The 16 Pz (Generalmajor Hube) was subordinated to the Army Corps and had reached Radziechow, through Krystynopol, at 17:00 hours. At that point was halted due to traffic jam. By nightfall, the 11 Pz had reached the villages of Kozyn y Ptycza (12 kms SW of Dubno); the 57 ID had reached Beresteczko and the area north of it. Own aerial reconnaissance reported strong armored elements south of Radziechow – Leszniow. Besides that, motorized columns were closing from Brody; the Soviets were gathering forces all along the southern flank. Therefore, the 57 ID should cover toward south. The Supply Staff was shifted to Stojanow during the morning.

The Conquest of Dubno – 25 June 1941

The road Horbkow – Tartakow was under machine gun and artillery fire. The enemy which was approaching from Poryk towards Tartakow – Sokal met the covering force; there was deployed a German infantry battalion. The 57 ID was watching over the motorized enemy closing up from Lopatyn and Leszniew.

The fighting in the fortified area of Sokal started again. Almost 20 bunkers were manned by enemy remnants, which could not admit the defeat. The Pi Btl 51 was engaged there and had to fight bunker by bunker. The 11 Pz pressed on against weak enemy with its Schütz. Rgt. 110 during the night, so could reach the area south of Dubno by 07:30 hours.

The 11 Pz’s Reconnaissance Detachment (Aufkl. Abt.) pressed northwards on Mlynow throuhg the wooded land and then proceeded towards Dubno. At 11:00 hours Dubno was attacked from two sides, north and south. The Soviets counterattacked with tanks against the german flank but without success. At 14:10 hours Dubno was firmly in german hands and free of enemies.

The frontline’s battalions belonging to the 57 ID reached Lopatyn and Leszniew at 15:00 hours. Southwards of them, seemingly, the enemy was gathering troops for a new thrust. The 16 Pz’s bulk left the forest located east of Radziechow once the 11 Pz’ rear echelons had cleared the roads. The Corps’ Staff was shifted to Beresteczko.

In the afternoon already was running among the German columns the rumour that hostile tanks had reached Ostrow and the area north of Beresteczko. This “panzerphobia” sowed fear, so on the north route of march the columns attempted to turn back towards Stojanow blocking the path in that way. Over the south route of march, the Army Corps’ Staff could stop at once that movements of retreat. However, the hasty destruction of the wooden bridge over the Styr river at Merwa could be avoided.

The enemy seized the initiative – 26 June 1941

Around 06:00 hours, the 16 Pz’s spearhead had reached the Styr at Plaszowa and by 14:30 hours stormed west of Krzemienice with its reconnaissance detachment (Aufkl. Abt), motorcyclist battalion (Kradschützenbatallion) and the panzer regiment. At 06:00 hours, the 11 Pz had seized Mlodawa. At 14:00 hours in Warkowiecze, the panzers engaged enemy tanks closing in from the northeast.

The Rifle Brigade’s attack got better and could reach Wielka Moszczanica with its vanguard, by afternoon it was at Buszcza. At 09:00 hours, the 57 ID reported a big enemy tank attack developed south Leszniew. By noon the situation there had became serious. In spite of the great resistence put by the I./ IR 179, the Russian could get across the brook reaching the town with heavy artillery fire support.

The bridge located south of Leszniew was under enemy control so it could not be destroyed at that time. Isolated Russian armored groups were pushing against the Styr river by Kol. Mytnika and west of Beresteczyko. Wisely, the German infantry and artillery deployed north of Leszniew carried out a withdrawal before the enemy blow.

However, thanks to the Soviet high command planning with regards to the future thrusts and the effort of the 57 ID’s Commanding Officer, the enemy could not exploit its initial success. Parts of the IR 199 (reinforced) which was moving to Sitno in order to watch the flank there, was turned south with the mission of rejecting the enemy breakthrough.

The Army Corps pressed ahead all the antitank guns it could get. The Luftwaffe bombed all the enemy assembly areas on both sides of the road Brody – Leszniew. By noon the Army Corps could not ascertain yet the overall situation. The struggle’s outcome was uncertain by the time being. If the enemy would have got success with its armored attempt at Radziechow, the Army Corps’ situation would be critical now.

In the afternoon, the 16 Pz was fighting at Krzemienice with its advance guard while the mass of it was cut off by the enemy attacks on Leszniew and still stood west of the Styr. South and southeast of Beresteczko the enemy carried out raid tanks on Redkow from Ostrow blocking occasionally the Panzerstraße. The Styr’s bridges were prepared for blasting as a precaution, however by gathering all the still available antitank guns under orders of the Regiment “Herrmann Göring”’s Commanding Officer the enemy could be rejected towards Ostrow, losing great numbers of tanks in the action. The situation required urgently the Army Corps’ Commanding Officer presence, which arrived at Beresteczko after a hazardous trip from Dubno. Due to the aerial raids and the proximity of Soviet tank forces (they approached up to 6 kilometers from Beresteczko) the Army Corps’ CP was shifted to a farm located 2 kilometers northwest of the town.

The Supply Staff which was on the Styr’s south bank was shifted to Smolawa. Those parts from the IR 199 that were turned off to the south could successfully establish – together with the IR 179 – a strong defensive line south of the Panzerstraße by evening. The Russian did not understand how to use it success against the very vulnerable Army Corps’ flank. Those isolated and locally tanks’ raids which almost never had infantry with them made possible to keep our own armored forces free in order to employ it with our defence and ultimately led the enemy to its failure.

The number of the destroyed Russian tanks was considerable only in the area north of Leszniew were destroyed 30 to 40 tanks. With the seizure of Dubno large depots of ammunition, fuel and supplies were captured, besides were taken several light and medium batteries of artillery and 42 mortars of 210 mm. In the evening the situation could be regarded as secured. A hard combat day went to its end.

The offensive was resumed. The Ostrog’s seizure (27 June 1941)

The 16 Pz met enemy defensive positions before Krzemieniec, hence the village could not be reached. After heavy fights a little bridgehead was established on the Ikwa’s sector. Later it was attacked in its rear by hostile troops carrying out a withdrawal. The division’s road march was cut at Sitno by enemy tanks approaching from the south. The Russian gathered some troops north of the Ikwa’s bridgehead and then launched an assault.

This brought some difficulties for the Schützenbrigade and the spearhead troops because its march was halted again by hostile tanks deployed within the woods located south of the Panzerstraße. Great numbers of heavy tanks were discovered again in the sector of Sitno – Ikwa. An aerial attack carried out by the Luftwaffe was out of question since the german lines there were unknown or at least badly located.

Around 05:00 hours, the 11 Pz had reached Ostrog with its Schützenbrigade. The Pz Regiment was fighting west of Mizocz yet. After launching its attack, the 57 ID could reach the old defensive positions in the Slonowka’s sector at Leszniew in spite of strong enemy resistance. That Division was detached from the Pz Korps and attached to the XXXXIV AK, which followed south of the Corps. In order to cover the Pz Corps’ flank was attached now the 16 ID (Mot) under Generalmajor Henrici, which had reaching Beresteczko. The Pz Jäg Abt 670 and one Flak battery were brought later.

The Army Corps though the retreating enemy was unable to launch any attack against its rear for the time being. Meanwhile the 11 Pz had seized the crossing point at Ostrog. The bridgehead established there was viciously counterattacked by the foe. The Panzer Regiment had finally defeated the enemy at Mizocz and had been directed towards Ostrog. According to the orders, the Division was to move its logistic troops forward and in doing so to remove all the obstacles from the main supply road.

The foreseen change of the Army Corps’ HQ was halted due to the second route to Dubno by Demidowka was harassed by hostilr troops. The Arko 108 who was moving with the Advance Guard towards Dubno received also this instruction. The situation of the 16. Pz. in the area of Werba had deteriorated that evening. A strong hostile armored unit tried to break through from Brody to Dubno. Air reconnaissance reported that a strong motorized column of all weapons with many tanks was moving along this road. The advanced parts of the 16. Pz., which were fighting at Krzemieniec, were cut off from the mass of the division by this column.

The liaison with the Rifle Brig (Schützenbrigade) could not be established; seemingly it was fighting hard against hostile troops at Honorotka. The Panzerstraße had been cut for the third time in those few combat days. The spearhead of the hostile tank forces advanced to Dubno and at Tarakanow had engaged parts belonging to the Corps’ Nachr. Abt (Signal Detachment) and the supply trains. However, the mass of the hostile troops were south of the Panzerstraße yet. The first heavy tanks (KV I and II) were reported. Seemingly, the 16 Pz’s Commanding Officer, General Hube together with parts of his Staff were encircled at Werba Kamienna.

If the enemy would have taken the weakly defended Dubno, then the whole supply route of the 11 Pz would have been cut. If the opponent would have turned southeastwards then the 16 Pz would have been in a very difficult situation. In order to fight successfully the threat of this armored force, the Schützenbrigade belonging to the 16 Pz should be pressed ahead, if necessary with escort of the tanks. The 11 Pz, meanwhile, was to remain within the bridgehead at Ostrog and to retain it at all cost.

The 16 ID (Mot), now under the Army Corps’ orders received the order to advance quickly towards Beresteczko. Again a hard day of combats lay in front of the German troops. All the units fulfilled its missions with fierceness and they stayed on the Panzerstraße in spite of the difficulties, threats in its flanks and successive ruptures carried out by the Soviets. The Russian tanks appeared unexpectedly in great numbers, imposing hard demands to the troops who fought them with success thanks to sufficient and effective antitank means. During the combats of days 26 and 27 of June of 1941, about 120 enemy tanks were destroyed on the battlefield.

Serious danger in the South flank (28 June 1941)

On Jun 28 1941, the 11 Pz continued towards Ostrog. Throughout that day the bridgehead established at Ostrog was attacked constantly with artillery support and successive aerial attacks. The losses within the division were substantial. In the evening of the 27 of June of 1941 a great enemy motorized and armored column, coming from Brody towards the northeast had penetrated between the vanguard and the Schützenbrigade of the 16 Pz. The fights of the riflemen within the forest of Honoratka persisted during the night without diminishing their intensity. In Dubno some Russian tanks, which had closing there, were repelled that day.

On Jun 27 1941 aerial reconnaissances which were fulfilled early, reported that hostile armored columns moved from Brody to Sitno and motorized forces were deployed in the fields, west and south of the Panzerstraße. A new enemy convoy with tanks was detected from Brody towards Dubno. Although the advance of the 111 ID, belonging to LV AK, from Mlynow in the direction of the east of Dubno, would reduce the danger on the city, the Army Corps had the impression that the Soviets were trying to isolate the Panzerstraße from Dubno towards the south. Around noon the 16 Pz could establish contact with its vanguard again and the long time ago encircled Divisional Commanding Officer could be released at last.

The enemy resistance before Krzemieniec strengthened, since the opponent apparently brought forward strong artillery there. Due to the strong fire coming from a well developed defensive line, the Kradschützenbatallion should be taken back to the western bank at the Ikwa bridgehead. The Schütze-Brigade destroyed parts of strong Russian infantry in the fights south of Kozyn and shot numerous tanks in doing so. For the time being, an attack over the Ikwa’s sector against the controlling high ground area around Krzemieniec - heights 369, 354 - would be heavy and time-consuming. In addition remained the threat materialized by the tanks and motorized Forces, which were deployed within the forest west the Panzerstraße Werba - Dubno.

The kommandierende general - Gen.d.Pz.Tr Kempf - decided to solve the situation south of Kozyn by means of an attack carried out with strong parts of the 16.Pz. against Krzemieniec and to only attack the enemy southwest Dubno when it came out of the forest area. This plan was approved by the 1º Pz Group and later was planned to direct the 16.Pz on the 11.Pz’s route of advance. An employment of the still marching and sobreextended 16 I.D(Mot. ) promised little success due to the strong superiority of the opponent in tanks

In the meantime, the 111 I.D. (LV.A.K.) had crossed Dubno in its march eastward with the order to get across the Ikwa further to the south. However, since the opponent had strengthened before Dubno in the late afternoon with infantry and tanks, bringing forward its artillery, the LV.A.K ordered back towards Dubno a reinforced Battalion upon the request of the motorized corps (XXXXVIII AK). The situation in Dubno became critical again during the evening. The enemy attacked in the west of the city with tanks and infantry.

The City Commander, General von Stumpfeld, asked for an urgent support but the Army Corps could no longer correspond it that night. However, the 16. Pz.Div received the order to secure the road from Brody to Dubno by deploying security troops against Krzemieniec and to organize a strong mixed combat team available in order to attack against the enemy southwest Dubno.

On Jun 28 1941, the 11.Pz. was to hold Ostrog. All day long the bridgehead in Ostrog was under strong attacks of artillery and aerial raids. The losses of the division were substantial.

The struggle for Dubno (29 June 1941)

In the night of 28 to 29 June 1941, Dubno had been attacked around midnight again and again by strong enemy forces. However, the writers and the soldiers of the Signal Corps could repel the attacks on the town’s outskirts, by employing all the available forces, even the drivers.

The planned relief by a reinforced combat team of 16 Pz, could not take place, because the Kradschützenbatallion, which had been left as a protection force against Krzemienice, was attacked again by heavy tanks and cavalry from the southeast and the west. It cannot withstand the strong enemy pressure and was driven back from its positions to the northwest.

The division was compelling also to hold its tank regiment ready in the area of Werba Kamienna - Stobiec in such a way that it could be employed, according the situation, towards southeast or to the northeast toward Dubno.

The offensive against Dubno had reached its peak around 04:00 hours when the Russian, with infantry and armored forces – some of them armed with guns of 152 mm - stormed against the German lines. At that time reached the Corps the news that parts of the 44 ID already were advancing some 15 km north of Dubno having the order to settle down the situation within the city.

On the other hand, apparently, on Jun 29 at noon, the opponent had broken thorugh the 111 ID’s lines southeastward Dubno and then proceeded to the east of the town. The 16.I.D. (mot.) stood yet with its mass west of the Styr river due to road blockages and bad traffic conditions.

Only the Aufklarungs Abteilung secured Bokujma as ordered, in order to keep at least the northern road open towards Dubno, so that heavy antitank weapons of the division could be moved through Mlynow to Dubno. The division now received the instruction of gathering as soon as possible a regimental group ready at Beresteczko in order to employ it northward against the opponent which had broken through Werba.

Since in the meantime, the enemy had advanced west of the Panzerstraße and had occupied Werba, the 16 Pz. got now the following instruction: to take Werba immediately throwing the Russians back. At 14:00 hours, Werba was taken as ordered. From Dubno the messages rushed in; since 13:00 hours again heavy enemy attacks were under way against the city with infantry, tanks and strong artillery support.

The Army Corps' Commanding Officer (kommandierende general) went to the 16 Pz, in order to be able with regards to ascertain personally on the situation southwest Dubno. It was not thought to proceed eastwards with the division before the situation there had been solve. Finally - at 17:00 hours – arrived the reassuring message of the Commander of the city of Dubno, stating that all the attacks had been repelled with the destruction of several hostile tanks.

Fortunately, the telephonic message arrived before: "Dubno in Russian hand!" had not been true. The 44.I.D and the Aufklarungs Abteilung of the 16.I.D. (mot.) did not arrive yet. During this tense day, the 11 Pz was far ahead within the Ostrog - Wielbowno’s bridgehead, however without establishing liaison with the III Pz Korps coming from the north yet, due to the constant attacks of the opponent with artillery and tanks.

The enemy still had the absolute air’s rule over the division and it also continued its low level attacks with bombs and cannons causing high losses. The Army Corps feared now the strong enemy tank forces located north Ostrog could affect its maneuver, nevertheless the order of the Pz Group for Jun 30 1941 was to push on eastward having Szepetowka (45 km eastward Ostrog) as its goal and then Polonnoje (30 km eastward Szepetowka). As its first objective the 11 Pz had the heights located northeastwards of Krupiec (18 km eastward Ostrog).

However, since up to the evening no more messages over the situation there were received at the Army Corps’ CP, the possibilities of such an attack cannot be ignored. The 16 Pz was to push on over Dubno to Zaslaw (30 km southeast Ostrog) after clearing the situation southwest of Dubno. The 16 ID (Mot.) should take over the blocking positions along the road leading from Brody to Dubno, in order to prevent the escape of the enemy forces located south and west of Dubno towards the south.

The 57.I.D, advancing from Leszniew to the south, had reached Brody at 15:00 hours during this day. The 75.I.D threw the opponent back to the southeast after its raid over Sitno and had reduced, at least, the threat on the 16 Pz from the area of Krzemieniec.

During the night little favorable messages arrived with regards to the next days’ intentions. While in Dubno the night had passed without attacks, the combat team of the 16 Pz which had advanced over Werba met at Ptycza with very strong hostile tank forces and had to set off. In the darkness it was attacked by superior Russian infantry forces with flame throwers and wild „Hurrä roar “ hence it should take itself back again to the south of Werba. The hard night operations demanded heavy losses.

The breakthrough on Dubno, intended for the 30 of Jun 1941 must be shifted from there. It required first detailed preparations and artillery support. The strong hostile tank forces had resisted under violent counter attacks toughly, with a reinforcement and likewise any action of these forces from the forest area located southeastward Dubno should be still counted.

Bridgehead at Ostrog threatened. Everything comes to a hold (30 June 1941)

The difficulties of the 11 Pz in the Ostrog’s bridgehead still grew during the night. After heavy fight against hostile forces far superior in infantry and tanks the German troops within the advanced bridgehead at Wielbowno had to be taken back at the beginning of the night. Regardless its very strong losses the enemy with new forces approached from the northeast and the southwest, pushes against the bridgeheads in.

Despite the heavy artillery fire and the violent air strikes on the city, the division could keep the Wilja crossing open for the traffic employing its last reserves. The ammunition supply of the division during the night did not succeed. In spite of the, so far, unbelievable road condition in Russia, nevertheless the fields on the right of and on the left of the so-called roads had been still passable. However now, night downpours had transformed everything into a hopeless morass in the shortest time. The difficulties in the supplying grew and discounting the ammunition, they already affected noticeably the defensive power of the division in advance. An aerial resupply was a partial and insufficient remedy.

On Jun 30 1941, in the morning, the enemy's reinforcements were still flowing and it was considered that in front of the bridgehead of Ostrog was deployed at least one enemy division. The continuous attacks, mainly from the air, forced the division to send a message saying that the offensive would be reassumed on Jul 01 1941 and only after regrouping to the north of Ostrog. The armored force that attacked from the northeast in coming from the Hoszcza’s neighborhood, continued its pressing during the day and it was still reported another force marching upwards from Zaslaw - 30 kilometers to the south-east of Ostrog.

The aerial reconnaissance carried out in the morning, again had determined the presence of strong hostile armored forces against the 16 Pz to the south and the north of Ptycza on both sides of the highway. More than 100 tanks, among them those of heavy type and two turrets, could be recognized. The Army Corps demanded the use of the ground-attack aviation against the enemy assembly areas. Nevertheless it was not possible during that morning. The division had to change the sector of the imminent attack, particularly since it had still to reject attacks of the opponent supported by tanks on Werba.

On Jun 30 1941, in the morning, the enemy's reinforcements were still flowing and it was considered that in front of the bridgehead of Ostrog was deployed at least one enemy division. The continuous attacks, mainly from the air, forced the division to send a message saying that the offensive would be reassumed on Jul 01 1941 and only after regrouping to the north of Ostrog. The armored force that attacked from the northeast in coming from the Hoszcza’s neighborhood, continued its pressing during the day and it was still reported another force marching upwards from Zaslaw - 30 kilometers to the south-east of Ostrog.

The aerial reconnaissance carried out in the morning, again had determined the presence of strong hostile armored forces against the 16 Pz to the south and the north of Ptycza on both sides of the highway. More than 100 tanks, among them those of heavy type and two turrets, could be recognized. The Army Corps demanded the use of the ground-attack aviation against the enemy assembly areas. Nevertheless it was not possible during that morning. The division had to change the sector of the imminent attack, particularly since it had still to reject attacks of the opponent supported by tanks on Werba.

In the early morning the Qu.Abt followed the leading Ops HQ of the Corps on the north road towards Dubno. Also even in the afternoon the 16 Pz could not progress substantially, because its tank regiment was not fully operational due to the heavy night operations. It was only on Jul 01 and after softening barrages of the entire artillery when it was able and working at full capacity in order to accomplish the destruction of the tank enemy force located southwest of Dubno.

The 16 ID (mot.) was still in the night into the area located southeastward of Wierchow. Also the order issued by the Pz Group stating that the 11 Pz should get across the Horyn River this very day and then to proceed on Schepetowka under all circumstances was impracticable and should be shifted for the next day.